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Abstract 
In the paper are analysed post-socialist development in South-East Europe (SEE) and the role of industrial policy. Countries of 
the SEE introduced market and other post-socialist transition reforms applying the so-called ‘shock therapy’, with subsequent 
transitory drop in GDP, standard of living and industrial production. Particularly industrial collapse happened to appear as the 
‘Achilles heel’ of the SEE economy. The SEE 2020 Strategy tends to reverse current trends from the consumption-led model of 
growth to export-led and foreign direct investment (FDI) driven type of growth, based on accelerated technological 
development, growth of competitiveness and completion of socioeconomic reform. However, there has been no evidence that 
is the FDI type of growth would be more efficient for regional development than that based on regional savings, remittances 
and resources of domestic investors. We have shown that the FDI in the SEE are three times lower than the amount of regional 
savings and remittances. In recent years domestic sources tremendously exceeded the total sum of FDI. The current situation 
and future prospects call for developing a common approach in this region, and concomitant supra-national regulations and 
institutional arrangements. 
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1. Introduction 
The countries in South-East Europe (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Kosovo and 
Metohija, Montenegro and Serbia) introduced market 
reforms in accordance with the so-called ‘shock therapy’, 
followed by a transitory drop in almost all macroeconomic 
indicators, i.e., in GDP, employment, standard of living, 
industrial production, and so forth. (The geographical scope 
of this group of countries coincides with the ‘Western 
Balkans’.)
1
 Such approach to post-socialist reforms has been 
                                                             
1 Already at this point we emphasize that this group of countries is heterogeneous, 
the key differences among them deriving from various historical paths, dominant 
ideologies, cultural patterns, development phases, demographic characteristics, 
institutional and organizational cultures, ethnical structures, etc. However, despite 
these differences, they have all declared, at least nominally, a number of common 
the mainstream in ideological and political changes after the 
fall of the Berlin wall, paralleling the predicaments of the 
Washington Consensus, viz., privatization, liberalization and 
stabilization (Williamson, 1990). The very idea of the ‘shock 
therapy’ was to introduce quick and irreversible changes 
towards market economy. The former Yugoslavia had been 
for a long time an exception to this pattern. In the second half 
of 1990s, instead of the ‘shock-therapy’, the so-called 
‘gradualist approach’ was favoured, which paid particular 
                                                                                                        
strategic goals, viz.: a readiness to be better integrate into EU economic flows, in 
parallel to more intensive cooperation within and/or with the EU, openness to 
trade, FDI and transfer of  know-how, effort to improve on the poor technical 
infrastructure, integration of domestic and global labor markets, an effort to 
improve on the current slow competitiveness and productivity, a readiness to 
combat deindustrialization, a readiness to combat high unemployment, 
decisiveness to eliminate corruption and crime, etc. 
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attention to the significance of institutional and legal 
framework, while decreasing the social costs of reforms 
(Nellis, 1999; Stiglitz, 1999). 
As for the former Yugoslav Republics, they seem to have 
failed in attracting the necessary FDI, ostensibly for a lack of 
intraregional integration and intangible resources (Broadman 
et al.2004). In sum, the inflow of FDI was limited and 
insufficient in the majority of Balkan countries (Demekas, et 
al. 2005a), especially in relation to the CEE (Central-East 
European) countries (Christie, 2003; Estrin and Uvalic, 2013). 
Demekas, et al. (2005b) reported that the countries of SEE 
can attract FDI by adopting FDI-friendly policies (key are the 
policies that affect relative unit labor costs, the corporate tax 
burden, infrastructure, and the trade regime). They find that 
high levels of labor costs, corporate tax and import tax can 
discourage FDI. Also, they indicated that a liberal trade 
regime and reforms in the infrastructure sector can encourage 
FDI, just as improving governance and reducing corruption 
may not have a major direct impact on FDI. 
Gray and Jarosz (1995) pointed to the fact that the majority 
of the SEE region is considered as the periphery of the EU, in 
geographical, economic and social terms. In these countries, 
the so-called transition to a market-oriented economy 
included a reform of traditional institutions and the 
introduction of new tools for adapting traditional 
organizational ways and institutional transformation driven 
by socio-economic and political change (Tsenkova, 2012). 
In this paper, some global challenges of transitional 
economic development in the seven countries of the SEE are 
analyzed, together with the role of industrial policy, and the 
possibilities to reverse the trend from a consumption-led 
model of growth to an export-led and FDI driven type of 
growth, vis-à-vis the backdrop of pertinent propositions from 
the Strategy of SEE 2020. This Strategy focuses on 
stimulating the key long-term drivers of growth for the 
region, as compared with the challenges these countries have 
been facing since the beginning of 1990s, especially those 
relating to the uncertainties of globalization; the erratic 
introduction of regulations (reflected either via regional 
convergence of regulations, similar to the regulatory regimes 
worldwide, which includes place-based policy and policy-
oriented coordination between regulatory authorities; or via 
highly fragmented regulations used as a protectionist tool at 
country level); and the barriers pertaining to the rather poor 
absorptive capacity of the sectors and the SEE economies for 
effectuating more FDI. 
The transitional gap in the SEE countries was widely 
attributed to international financial institutions and pertinent 
experts; to the mistakes in the introduction of 
macroeconomic policies, i.e., non-readiness for market 
reforms; to some lacking necessary reform steps, and to the 
limitations of the political system. During the second half of 
the 1990s, the shock therapy was abandoned in favor of the 
so-called gradualist approach. This is the main motif and 
reason why we have chosen to examine the transformation of 
the socio-economic development of the SEE countries in the 
transitional period and their future perspectives, bearing in 
mind their post-socialist contextualizing, as well as the 
importance of industrial policy. 
2. Theoretical Background and 
Transitional Context 
Assuming that the level of FDI depends on the local 
institutional arrangement, Fabry and Zeghni (2010), pointed 
to the fact that the weak FDI level in the seven SEE countries 
has resulted from ill-adapted institutions. Bijsterbosch and 
Kolasa (2009) have argued that FDI is not the only channel 
through which international technological diffusion may 
occur. The connection between FDI and economic growth in 
developing countries has a theoretical background in the 
framework of the international technology diffusion (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin,1997), in the theory of endogenous growth 
(Romer, 1990), as well as in the theory of neoclassical 
growth (Wang, 1990)which assumes that increasing the 
knowledge applied to industry can be expected as a function 
of FDI. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) have argued that the 
capacity of local firms to absorb knowledge from FDI can be 
conditioned by their innovation effort, as well as by 
competitive pressure, financial market development and 
regulations. 
The empirical evidence on the role of FDI in transition 
economies has been different. Mencinger (2003) has argued 
that the relationship between FDI and GDP growth is 
negative in eight Central and Eastern European economies 
(in the period 1994-2001), because of the nature of FDI. 
Discourse on economic dynamics and development change in 
post-socialist countries of SEE has centered on the conflicts 
between comprehensive vs. incremental planning; centralized 
vs. decentralized decision-making; top-down vs. bottom-up 
approaches, and interventionist vs. entrepreneurial market-
driven planning (Altrock, et al. 2006). The transition to a 
market economy includes a reform of traditional institutions, 
particularly in some regions of SEE (Tsenkova, 2012). The 
economy in each of the SEE countries was different before 
the crisis, and, therefore, the consequences of the crisis are 
different in each of them. In 2008, in Bulgaria, Romania, 
Slovenia, Albania and Serbia, the growth of GDP was around 
3%, while in the other SEE countries the rate was almost zero 
(GDP growth in the EU-27 was 1.0%). Global economic and 
financial crisis in SEE has been deeper than elsewhere, with 
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low development regional status, low economic growth, high 
unemployment, with an informal economy, massive informal 
buildings, uncertainties relating to the impact of globalization, 
inappropriate institutional framework for the new 
development mode, poor technical infrastructure, huge public 
debt, poverty, refugees, and a prolonged regulatory gap in 
economy, investment, and development. Also, the completion 
of post-socialist transition reforms, now more in accord with 
the EU Community acquis (acquis communautaire), is 
undoubtedly important, also as a precondition for a 
subsequent inclusion into the Union. Still, there have been a 
number of open issues regarding the dominant neoliberal 
approach to resolving economic and social issues during 
development. 
Concomitant collapse of industrial development appeared to 
be the ‘Achilles heel’ of the SEE economy, ‘stuck’ in 
transition, especially after the outbreak of the crisis in 2008 
and the latter national crises. The crisis persisted despite the 
fact that these countries were steadily improving their trade 
within the EU, mostly via massive inflow of FDI, and the 
economic openness directed to the EU ‘anchor’. The 
economic development of the SEE countries is a reflection of 
the previous transitional development policy, ingenuity gap 
and other factors. On average, the socioeconomic 
performance of this region in the past 5-6 years has been poor, 
and no effective improvement has been achieved as 
compared to the pre-crisis period. These countries have 
experienced an additional decrease in productivity, reform 
stagnation or reversals, high unemployment, mostly steady 
inflation, a slowdown in domestic demand, growth of 
remittances from abroad and regional development 
imbalances. 
In analyzing the dynamics of the development changes in the 
SEE countries in the post-socialist period, we applied the 
method of simple moving averages (i.e. growth of GDP, GDP 
per capita, rates of FDI, public debt, and budget deficit). The 
method of moving averages is a calculation for analyzing 
data points by creating a series of averages of different data 
sets for the relevant fields in short-term or long-term cycles. 
A particularly unfavourable characteristic within this mostly 
bleak development is a strong process of deindustrialization 
that took place in this region. Its negative consequences were 
intensified by large territorial differences in industrial 
development within the SEE countries, stemming either from 
the socialist period, or were generated under the 
circumstances of ‘proto-capitalism’. 
A number of influential European and regional commentators 
and institutions have recognized that the above-mentioned 
development trend, apart from its current non-sustainability, 
has generated a number of other negative impacts on the 
future development of the region, and, consequently, a new 
trend is needed - one with a view to redirecting the existing 
development trend. Such findings and aims have been 
reflected in a number of strategic documents, which have 
been recently adopted and promulgated, most notably, in the 
SEE 2020 Strategy. This Strategy focuses on stimulating 
innovation, skills and trade integration, with five main pillars: 
integrated, smart, sustainable, inclusive growth and 
governance for growth. Its basic idea is to reverse the current 
trends, from the consumption-led model of growth to an 
export-led and FDI driven type of growth, as a result of 
accelerated technological development, growth of 
competitiveness and completion of socioeconomic reform. 
There has been no mention of a new industrial policy for the 
SEE region, except that the establishment of industrial zones 
in some countries has been stipulated. 
The SEE countries, like other former centrally planned 
economies, had been realizing for decades the development 
strategies based on industrialization, and industry played the 
most important role in many respects, viz., regarding its 
contribution to GDP formation, its share in total employment 
and its share in total international trade. Contrary to this, the 
neoliberal concept of development, introduced at the 
beginning of the post-socialist transition period, i.e., in the 
1990s, has resulted in a sharp deindustrialization. 
The above outlined features and institutional context 
represent the main theme of this contribution, which 
comprises a discussion on the following issues: 1) General 
challenges of socioeconomic development in the SEE 
countries (policy framework) followed by the presentation 
and interpretation of general data, key indicators and 
comparative analyses of industrial development in the SEE 
countries.; 2) Comparative presentation and assessment of 
the regional industrial development, also depicting some 
causes and consequences of this process, and focusing on the 
issues of deep deindustrialization in the transitory economies; 
3) Discussions about development changes in the SEE 
countries, as well as some possibilities of  reversing the 
current consumption-led model of growth to an export-led 
and FDI driven type of growth (based on the propositions of 
the SEE 2020 Strategy) and the importance of regional 
savings and remittances. Roles of FDI, regional savings and 
remittances are briefly commented; and 4) Comments on the 
new European reindustrialization strategy and some 
recommendations for the SEE countries. Conclusions and 
recommendations for the future industrial policy in the SEE 
countries are based on previous comprehensive analyses and 
findings. We are summarizing the challenges that the SEE 
countries have been facing with regard to their future 
(Zekovic and Vujosevic, 2014): 
 Low development status of the entire region which is also 
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very differentiated. 
 Uncertainties relating to the impact of the globalization 
process, for instance, in terms of global cross-border 
capital flows, not fully known potential markets, a lack of 
foreign market knowledge etc. 
 Inappropriate institutional arrangements and regulations 
for the new development cycle, firstly, in terms of the 
harmonization of solutions among the national legislative 
systems of the SEE countries. In this respect, at least two 
options may be in sight, viz, either a regional convergence 
of regulations, mostly in accord with similar regulatory 
regimes worldwide, for example, related to place-based 
policy and policy-oriented coordination between 
regulatory authorities; or the continuation of highly 
fragmented national regulations, mostly used as a 
protectionist tool (at  country level). The convergence may 
be envisaged in a multitude of forms, combining various 
de iure and de facto arrangements. 
 Poor technical infrastructure, particularly the poor links to 
the European TEN-T core network corridors, also 
including its bleak prospects until 2030. 
 Huge public debt, while public finances are on the verge 
of collapse. 
 Most influential international participants are not always 
supportive of the integration processes in this region. 
Since 1990, Central and East European economies have 
experienced increasing economic integration with the EU 
via trade and FDI (Traistaru et al. 2002). 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Comparative Analysis of Industrial 
Development in the SEE Region 
In recent years, the SEE region has been facing a further 
slowdown of economic activities, with only erratically 
recorded slight improvements, viz.: a drop in industrial 
production, consumption and investment; persistent high 
unemployment, and growth of poverty. The main problems of 
the SEE economic and industrial development even before 
the global economic crisis have largely been a consequence 
of the process of transitional changes and the changes in the 
wider surroundings. These changes have had an impact on 
the socioeconomic and territorial concentration of 
development. The key problems have stemmed from an 
insufficiently competitive economy (industry), 
untransformed current structure, and a slow transitional 
process of privatization and the restructuring of enterprises. 
Among them, especially important are the relatively low 
level of economic and industrial activity, slow structural 
change, large regional disparities in development and 
disposition of industrial capacities, low level of investments, 
high unemployment, low competitiveness, a lagging in 
innovations, know-how, new technologies, a number of 
inefficiencies in the utilization of material inputs, and a lack 
of capital regional infrastructure. 
Based on the available data or indicators of the structural 
changes (transition reforms, such as privatization, 
liberalization, marketization, etc.), at the beginning of 1990s, 
the SEE countries were on average undeveloped, as 
compared to the EU average. Despite the boosterish attitude 
of the leading ‘architects’ of transition policy changes, the 
reforms rendered a further decrease in economic and social 
performance. Particularly striking was the dramatic decrease 
in industrial employment in the period 1989-2012 by 1.33 
million employees, as well as a ‘toxic’ decrease in the 
industrial share of the GDP (from 44.5% to 18.43%, in the 
same period) and gross added value. Paralleling a general 
trend of deindustrialization, the largest number of lost jobs 
was recorded in the industrial sector, particularly in Serbia, 
i.e., 700,810 (Table 1). Deindustrialization occurred as a 
direct result of the chosen direction of economic change from 
the beginning of 1990s, which has been demonstrated as a 
consumption-led model based predominantly on increasing 
services, mostly import-based and fuelled by an expansionary 
credit policy.
2
 While industrial production in the countries of 
Central Europe has doubled in the last 20 years, in the 
Balkans it fell by 40-70% in the same period. The outbreak 
of the global crisis in 2008 – and the concomitant national 
crises – only accentuated the structural flaws, rendering them 
even more complex as the crisis prolonged. 
It was a matter of few years, during which the corporate 
sector in the SEE region sank even deeper into a crisis, 
before many commentators were urging its thorough 
restructuring (see Bartlett and Prica, 2011, Schadler, 2011 
Estrin and Uvalic, 2013, Sanfey, 2011, Mencinger, 2003, 
Kiss, 1997). While various approaches were suggested, they 
have almost all kept to a common denominator: recovery 
from recession would not be possible without new industrial 
development (Gligorov, 2013). Even prior to this, at the 
political and institutional levels of the SEE region, it was 
recognized that some common approach would have to be 
established with regard to investment policy. A document, 
adopted in Vienna in 2006, comprised the Ministerial 
Declaration, the statement of Business Advisory Centre for 
SEE, and the Regional Network of Foreign Investors Council.  
                                                             
2 Another set of factors has also made this course of development to easily 
materilize, viz.: previously accumulated socioeconomic problems; specific 
problems in the industrial sector; the impact of some market factors; a lack of an 
effective national industrial and regional development policy; a lack of 
competition and innovation policy; general developmental lagging, and poor 
institutional development. 
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Table 1. Indicators of Industrial Growth in the SEE Countries in the Period 1989-2012. 
 
Total 
employees, 
1989 
Industrial 
employees, 
1989 
Total employees, 
2012 
Industrial 
employees, 2012 
Difference in 
industrial 
employees 
2012/1990 
Industry in 
GDP 3 (%, 
1989) 
Industry in 
GDP (%, 
2012) 
1. Albania   933,000 162,000 - - 19.1 
2. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1,085,308 471,955 684,508 128,682 -343,273 50.9 10.5 
3. Croatia 1,618,204 566,615 1,395,000 220,376 -346,239 38.9 20.0 
4. FYR 
Macedonia 
530,386 213,523 682,448 113,440 -100,083 53.4 11.2 
5. Montenegro 168,510 54,590 171,474 17,784 -36,806 36.1 14.65 
6. Serbia 2,621,989 1,035,389 1,705,256 334,579 -700,810 45.2 21.8 
7. Kosovo  243,441 86,232 115,120 32,885 -53,347 46.7 19.5 
SEE-7 Countries 6,024,397 2,342,072 5,686,806 1,009,746 -1,332,326 44.5 18.43 
Source: Federal statistics of SFRY, 1990, and National statistical data of the SEE countries (www.instat.gov.al/, www.bhas.ba, www.dzs.hr, www.stat.gov.mk, 
www.monstat.org/engwww.stat.gov.rs, data.worldbank.org, http://ask.rks-gov.net) http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=ALBANIA#Economic). 
* We will here follow a conventional political notion: ‘Designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244, and keep to it 
throughout this text and tables.  
Table 2. Some Economic Data on the SEE Countries (2012-2013). 
 Albania Bosnia&Herzeg. Croatia 
FYR 
Macedonia 
Monte-
negro 
Serbia Kosovo * 
SEE 
Countries 
1. Population  2,821,977 3,836,377 4,284,889 2,110,000 621,000 7,186,862 1,815,606 22,576,711 
2. Total 
employment  
933,000 684,508 1,395,000 682,448 171,474 1,705,256 115,120 5,686,806 
3. Unemployment  173,420 552,751 363,411 274,900 167,000 792,888 268,104 2.592,494 
4. GDP (in bill. €) 9.7 13.0 43.92 7.58 3.34 27.6 4.91 110.05 
5. GDP p.c. (in €) 
4 
3,437 3,130 10,294 3,592 3,378 5,279 2,704 4,544 
6. Public debt (% 
of GDP) 
60.6 44.3 56.3 33.3 51.1 63.7 23.14 55.5 
7.Budget deficit 
(in % of GDP) 
-3.3 -5.7 -5 -3.8 -4 -4.7 -5.1 -4.75 
8. Inflation rate 
(%) 
2.0 -1.2 3.0 0.94 0.3 9.5 2.5  
9. Central bank 
discount (in %) 
3.0 7.02 7.3 3.25 7.6 9.5 10.2  
Source: Based on National Statistics of SEE countries, 2013 World Economic Forum, GCI 2013, UNDP, UN, 2013 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, WB, 2012 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.RINR and authors calculation. 
Table 3. Summary of Comparative Analysis of Industry in SEE Countries (2012-2013). 
 Albania Bosnia&Herzeg. Croatia 
FYR 
Macedonia 
Monte-
negro 
Serbia Kosovo* 
SEE 
Countries 
1. Total employment  933,000 684,508 1,395,000 682,448 171,474 1,705,256 115,120 5,686,806 
2. Industrial 
employees  
162,000 128,682 220,376 113,440 17,784 334,579 32,885 1,009,746 
3. Share of industrial 
employees (in %)  
17.36 18.79 15.8 16.62 10.37 19.62 28,56 17.75 
4. Level of 
industrialization (%) 
5.74 3.35 5.14 5.37 2.86 4.65 1.81 4.47 
5. GDP of industry 
(in billion €) 
1.85 1.36 8.78 0.85 0.49 6.01 0.95 20.29 
6. GDP of industry 
(%) 
19.1 10.5 20.0 11.2 14.65 21.8 19.5 18.43 
7. GVA5of industry 
(%) 
19.0 13.0 26.0 18.0 6.0 16 - 19.5 
Source: Compiled from National Statistics of SEE countries, 2013 World Economic Forum, WB, 2012, GCI 2013, UNDP, UN, 2013, and CIA WORLD 
FACTBOOK. 
                                                             
3 GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
4 GDP p.c. – Gross Domestic Product per capita 
5 GVA – Gross Value Added 
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Table 4. FDI, Remittances and Savings in the SEE Countries (2012-2013). 
 Albania Bosnia&Herzeg. Croatia 
FRY 
Macedonia 
Monte-
negro 
Serbia Kosovo* 
SEE 
Countries 
1. FDI (in % of GDP)  7.7 2.0 2.36 2.94 14.2 0.14 7.0 3.15 
2. Remittances (in % of GDP) 10.9 12.9 2.43 4.0 7.5 10.4 8.9 7.0 
3. Savings (in % of GDP) 14.0 14.0 20.2 26 0.4 12.5 18.0 16.68 
4. Exports (in % of GDP) 31.8 36.2 42.2 52.6 40.3 41.0 20.1 39.95 
5. GDP (in billion €) 9.7 13.0 43.92 7.58 3.34 27.6 4.91 110.05 
Sources: National Statistics of SEE countries, Central banks, 2013 World Economic Forum, 2013, WB, 2012. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT and 2013 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, First release. 
In the background, there was a general dissatisfaction of 
investors in terms of investment opportunities in the SEE 
countries, which instigated the work on this document and its 
adoption. A number of unresolved issues were addressed by 
the participants, viz.: the implementation gap in the usage of 
the key laws in the fields of investment, ownership and 
spatial planning; administrative barriers for new investment; 
long procedures for construction permits; long procedures for 
conversion of land use; insufficient supply of industrial land, 
particularly for green-field investment; a lack of a common 
strategy to counter more competitive European regions. In 
December 2006, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and UNMIK 
signed a document to amend and enlarge the Central 
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), which stipulated 
an expansion of trade, smoother and faster investment, stable 
and predictable rules and the elimination of hindrances to 
investment. It was also recognized as the proper step towards 
easier inclusion of the SEE countries into the EU integration 
processes. This Agreement was preceded by the Energy 
Community Treaty, signed in 2005 by Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia 
and Kosovo, with a view to developing the SEE regional 
electricity market, as well as to stimulating overall economic 
development. 
Apart from its peripheral position in Europe (a part of the 
‘inner peripheries’’ of Europe, cf. Göler, 2005), and its poor 
competitiveness in the broader international context, the 
above-mentioned steps towards closer cooperation in the 
SEE region have been also urged by demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics of the SEE countries: 
individually, they are small and economically weak (Table 2), 
meaning that better development prospects might be 
provided by the appropriate harmonization of individual 
national development policies.  
More specific evidence on the state of development of the 
SEE countries also corroborates this thesis. The attained level 
of industrialization in the SEE region does not exceed 4.47%, 
with the industrial sector employing only 17.75% of the total 
number of employees. The share of industry in the GDP is 
18.43%, as compared to that for the EU-27 (24.9%); and it is 
comparable to those EU countries with debt problems (for 
example, Spain, Portugal, and Greece). Similarly, the 
industrial sector in the SEE region generated only 19.5% of 
GVA (Table 3). 
3.2. Interpretation and Discussion of the 
SEE 2020 Strategy: An Attempt to 
Reverse the Current Consumption-Led 
Model of Growth 
The SEE 2020 Strategy, adopted by the representatives of the 
participating states at the end of 2013, represents an attempt 
to reverse the now still dominant consumption-led model of 
growth to an export-led and FDI driven type of growth. It 
should also direct the future development of this region more 
in accord with the developed countries of Europe.
6
 
Intentionally, this switch should be based on accelerated 
technological development, growth of competitiveness and 
the completion of socioeconomic reform. This ought to also 
change the structure of the GDP in this region, more in 
accordance with the EU average, for example, in terms of the 
share of industry in total exports. As compared to the EU, 
with the pertinent share of 80%, in the SEE countries total 
exports have been 39.95 % of GDP in 2012/2013 (Table 4). 
The SEE 2020 Strategy stipulates trade liberalization and 
facilitation, as the key policy that will increase exports and 
FDI, also implying that this will enhance and speed up the 
integration of this region into the EU. According to SEE 2020 
Strategy, the recent development record of the countries of 
Central Europe should serve as a model for the SEE countries, 
especially with regard to FDI, being the factor of economic 
modernization of the former group. The overall FDI inflow in 
2010 was 3,396 million EUR, and an increase of up to 8,800 
million EUR has been predicted till 2020. In 2012, FDI in the 
SEE region were 3,467.9 million EUR, or 3.15% of GDP 
(Table 4). 
                                                             
6 In this respect, one may conceive at least two options. For example, Hall and 
Soskice ( 2001, p.9) draw a core distinction between advanced economies in this 
way: while in the liberal market economies (LME) activities of firms are 
coordinated via hierarchies and competitive market arrangements, in the 
coordinated market economies (CME) firms rely more on non-market 
relationships. ‘In any national economy, firms will gravitate toward the mode of 
coordination for which there is institutional support.’ Also, the CME mode of 
arrangements seems to better provide for innovation and coordination between 
universities and industry, as compared to the LME. On the other hand, as pointed 
out by Lindquist (2009: 66), an increase in export appears to feature as a priority 
in the LME group of countries. 
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There is no evidence that an FDI type of growth would be 
more efficient for the regional development of the SEE 
region, compared to the support of regional savings, 
remittances and domestic investors, as the key drivers of new 
development. In effect, the SEE 2020 Strategy does not count 
on remittances and savings, and does not even mention these 
two sources in the discussion on the investments to boost 
socioeconomic development of the SEE countries. It is rather 
surprising, concerning the fact that the average share of 
remittances and savings in GDP was 23.68%, as compared to 
only 3.15% for the share of FDI in the regional GDP, i.e., 7.5 
times larger (Table 4). This makes the proposed scheme 
highly disputable, and ultimately unacceptable. There is no 
single reason for which future development and cohesion 
should be based on a FDI driven type of growth, keeping in 
mind its tiny share in the GDP. The model based on FDI (as 
stated in the SEE 2020 Strategy) may well be workable in 
some economic sectors, for example, in mining, trade, 
banking, hotels, or in the service sector. Contrary to this, it 
seems more promising for sustained growth in other sectors 
to rest on remittances and savings, especially regarding new 
SMEs, self-employment, reducing poverty, reducing income 
disparities, survival of poor inhabitants, and raising the 
quality of living. The provided remittances and savings will 
keep their share in the GDP at the same or roughly similar 
level in the future. There has been no consensus on the 
influence of remittances on poverty reduction, income 
inequality, and their role as a source of self-employment or 
‘engine’ of long-run growth. As Petreski and Jovanovic 
(2012) emphasized, at least two contrasting views could be 
put forth regarding the effects of international remittances on 
the economy of the labor-sending country, which they 
depicted as ‘optimistic view’ and ‘pessimistic view’. While 
the former highly estimates the role of remittances as a 
mechanism for economic development, the latter perceives 
remittances as ‘parasitism’ that melts the economy. Petreski 
and Jovanovic (2012) pointed to the fact that remittances 
have become an ever more interesting source of foreign 
exchange earnings for developing countries, as compared to 
some other sources, specifically FDI, foreign aid, and private 
capital flows. 
The role of FDI is particularly debatable with respect to 
improving the competitiveness of the SEE region. So far, the 
export-led growth driven by FDI has been confined to the 
service sector. Further growth of FDI is expected in some 
SEE countries in the mining and processing of minerals and 
non-metals. This is indicated by the expansion of concessions 
and licenses for research, authorizations and exploitations of 
mineral resources, as well as by the arrival of multinational 
mining companies, especially in the resource-rich countries, 
such as Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Development change and growth, which were 
primarily based on the utilization of natural resources of the 
kind, nourished the spreading of the ‘rentier-state’ syndrome 
in the SEE region. In that respect, it would be safe to state 
that this model ought not to be qualified as ‘sustainable 
economic growth’, and especially not so pertaining to the 
future development prospects. Further doubts on FDI can be 
cast regarding their role in improving innovation-based 
competitiveness. For now, better chances for this, at least till 
2020, seem to lie in further improving the low-cost 
competitiveness model, i.e., in the advantages of the low 
costs of resources and labor, with a focus on greater volumes 
and lower prices, in the imported and copied technology, and 
in following trends. Even this approach would not be easy to 
follow keeping in mind the similarity of the export range of 
the SEE countries (based on agricultural products, livestock, 
timber, mineral raw materials, textiles, building materials), 
with a low level of finalized industrial products. This 
problem has been rendered even harsher by a poor intra-
regional trade, and a lack of a supra-national industrial policy 
in the SEE region. Such a policy may well introduce the 
necessary changes to the current export structure, with a view 
of increasing the supply of exportable market products, and 
thereby, departing from the current consumption-led model 
(based on massive imports). This, at least partially, applies to 
the need of substituting imported products with own 
industrial production, without which there will be no 
improvement of competitiveness. Also, the switch from a 
consumption-based model to a customer-led model would 
pose an almost completely different set of challenges to both 
companies and political authorities, especially regarding 
investment and credit policy. This issue also carries some 
important implications as well as a heavy political ‘baggage’, 
which will not be taken into consideration herein, except by 
recognizing its relevance.
7
 We believe that the efforts and 
achievements of the SEE region in the implementation of 
CEFTA, in initiating regional rules in the energy sector and 
infrastructure, agreements on trade and duty free exports to 
Russia, and similar, may play the role of stimulating factors 
for a strategically important industrial renaissance in the 
region. Should the elaboration of a common regional strategy 
prove workable, this would also necessitate a revision of the 
SEE 2020 Strategy, to comprise a more place-based approach 
in defining future industrial development. 
As for the future development prospects of the SEE countries, 
even prior to embarking upon the preparation of a common 
strategic development framework for industrial development, 
                                                             
7 This issue also carries a heavy political ‘baggage’, which will not be taken into 
consideration herein, except by recognizing its relevance. It is especially unclear 
how political authorities and banks will face the need to radically change 
expansionary credit policy, which characterizes the growth based on imports and 
domestic consumption. 
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each SEE country will have to internally change its stance 
regarding strategic thinking, research and governance 
(STRG), which is now in crisis in the SEE region. Most 
probably, there will be no room for improvement without a 
renewal of STRG, especially with regard to introducing a 
more place-based policy and policy-based distribution. The 
purposes of such a change would be as follows: 1) To play 
the role of the key instrument for integral management of 
territorial capital of the SEE region; 2) To establish a 
common denominator for the evaluation of general and 
sectoral investment policies, with a view to contributing to 
the betterment of comparative advantages and 
competitiveness of the SEE region and countries in the 
international political, economic, cultural and other 
competition; 3) To integrate key projects and programs into 
the general strategic framework (for example, within the 
concept of ITI/Integrated Territorial Investment) and place-
based approach; 4) To potentially provide a better inclusion 
of local active participants and local communities in strategic 
decision-making; 5) To provide for a departure from the now 
prevalent ‘development visions’ to applicable strategic 
concepts; and 6) To establish the preparation of national and 
regional strategic documents that have been requested as the 
precondition for the EU candidate states. Mostly contrary to 
the currently dominant planning approaches and practices, 
the ‘new economic development model’ is in favor of 
approaches and concepts that are place-based. 
4. The New European 
Reindustrialization Strategy 
Those who advocate a modern industrial policy, based on the 
stronger role of planning, emphasize that the main reason for 
introducing and implementing the industrial policy is the 
frequent and severe malfunctioning of the market 
mechanisms (Adams and Klein, 1985, Savic and Zekovic, 
2004). Correspondingly, the rapid weakening of the EU’s 
competitive abilities forced the EU leaders to undertake a 
comprehensive analysis of the causes, which has ultimately 
resulted in a series of new directions for change. The 
analyses have revealed that the EU made a crucial mistake 
‘…when its goal was not to preserve strong industry, but to 
base its economy on the services, which was the widely 
accepted (liberal) approach’ (Bollino, 1983). Hudson (1986) 
pointed to the important role of state in capitalist societies in 
the regional reindustrialization. Faced with stronger US and 
Chinese competitiveness, the EU political and economic 
cluster concluded that new solutions would have to be found 
for preserving the industry and industrial policy at the EU 
level. This initiative resulted in promulgating the Lisbon 
strategy 2000, subsequently revised on a number of 
occasions, and ultimately peaked in adopting The Strategy 
Europe 2020. Parallel to this, the European Commission 
launched a new strategy to reindustrialize Europe with the 
main aim of creating new jobs, and also included appropriate 
institutional arrangements to support economic 
restructuring.8A document titled For a European Industrial 
Renaissance was adopted on 22 January 2014, by means of 
which an appeal was launched to the Member States to 
recognize the principal importance of industry for creating 
jobs and growth, as well as to mainstream industry-related 
competitiveness concerns across all policy areas. The 
Commission suggested to have new proposals on energy, 
transport, space and digital communications networks 
adopted, as well as to implement the legislation pertaining to 
the completion of the EU internal market. The emphasis has 
been put on industrial modernization, meaning that the EU 
should continue to invest in innovation, resource efficiency, 
new technologies, skills and access to finance. The ultimate 
goals would be: firstly, to achieve a more business-friendly 
surroundings, which means simplifying the legislative 
framework; and secondly, to improve public administration 
efficiency at the EU, national and regional levels, followed 
by the harmonization of international standards, open public 
procurement procedures, patent protection and economic 
diplomacy. This was followed by another Communication (A 
vision for the internal market for products, 2014), which 
emphasized the need to rationalize the existing regulatory 
framework and support SMEs to access finances and 
strengthen the innovation management capacity of SMEs. 
This would altogether help further improve EU industrial 
competitiveness, and overcome the still present challenges, 
particularly with a view to realizing the goal of territorial 
cohesion, by applying a place-based approach and policy-
coordinated distribution. With a view to ‘restoring the 
attractiveness of Europe as a production location’, the place-
based approach should provide the following: 1) Increased 
investments in factories and research and development; 2) 
Expansion of the internal market and ‘the opening of 
international markets’; 3) ‘Open access to international 
markets’ for companies, especially SMEs, through new 
trading arrangements; and 4) Education and training, and 
better matching of supply and demand for labor. 
In order to revert the current downward trend, and to embark 
                                                             
8 The backdrop of this and similar initiatives was a further loss of jobs after the 
outbreak of the 2008 crisis, i.e., around 4 million industrial jobs lost, paralleled by 
a 10 % decrease in industrial production and a decline in manufacturing and 
competitiveness (http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/industrial-
competitiveness/industrialpolicy/files/20121010_slides_technical_briefing_en.pdf
). In the Competitiveness report 2013, it was stated that there would be ‘no 
growth and jobs without industry’, and ‘without a strong industrial base Europe’s 
economy cannot prosper’, in the EU. At the time, Antonio Tajani, Commissioner 
for Industry and Entrepreneurship, said that, ‘We cannot continue to let our 
industry leave Europe…. European industry can deliver growth and can create 
employment….Europe must reindustrialize for the 21st Century, because a strong 
industrial base is vital to a prosperous and economically successful Europe’. 
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on the course of reindustrialisation in the EU, the share of 
industry in the EU’s GDP should increase to 20% by 2020 (as 
compared to 15.6% in 2012). The reindustrialization of 
Europe should follow its ‘green way’ in coping with the 
challenges of climate change.  
The first document to announce the need to substantially 
increase the share of the manufacturing sector in the GDP 
was the European industrial strategy, published in October 
2012. The EC proposed to reverse then the growing trend of 
off-shoring European industrial establishments, as well as to 
invest more into innovative and/or clean sectors; thereby, at 
the same time creating wealth (following the slogan ‘back to 
the roots’) and giving unconditional priority to the EU’s 
climate targets. In this respect, especially the liasion between 
energy policy on the one hand, and climate policy and 
industrial policy on the other, came to the fore. The idea was 
to soothe the business sector, which was worried about the 
additional high costs for companies due to climate policies, 
carbon regulation and the possible increase in energy prices. 
In this document, it can also be ascertained that some of these 
goals were contradictory (cf. Die Welt, 2012). Following this 
track of thinking, in the document the Lisbon calls for EU 
reindustrialization, 2012, the concept of reindustrialization 
was presented to the EU Competitiveness Council, 
particularly vis-à-vis the problem of corporate relocation and 
pertinent loss of jobs in the EU. At the same time, this switch 
was also supported by a number of corresponding documents, 
viz.: Mission Growth: Europe at the Lead of the New 
Industrial Revolution, 2012; Report on the Member States, 
2012; the EU Efficiency Action Plan, 2011 and the EU 
Climate and Energy Package, 2009. They all stated that 
European economy would not survive in a sustainable way 
without a strong and profoundly reshaped industrial base, and 
stipulated the strengthening of the key pillars of the 
reinforced industrial policy of the EU, viz.: 1) Investments in 
innovation with a focus on six priority areas, with the 
potential for growth in Europe: manufacturing technologies 
for clean production, sustainable industrial and construction 
policy and raw materials, clean vehicles, bio-based products, 
key enabling technologies, and smart grids; 2) Improving 
market conditions; 3) Improving access to finance and 
capitals; 4) Improving human capital and skills for industrial 
transformations, as well as the cooperation between 
employers, workers and authorities; 5) Improving support to 
SMEs and reforming public administration; and 6) Increasing 
the share of new and renewable sources in total energy 
production (also designated as ‘low carbon dioxide, green 
and resources efficient activities’, ‘low carbon dioxide 
economy promotion’, ‘decarbonisation of economic 
activities’) in the total production to 20% until 2020. These 
and similar provisions were supported by the EU reforms 
aimed at improving business prospects and strengthening 
their competitiveness and industrial performance in the five 
fields: manufacturing productivity; export performance; 
innovation and sustainability; business environment and 
infrastructure; and finance and investment. The Strategy 
Europe 2020, A European strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth, 2010, featured as an ’umbrella document’ 
for this new approach, otherwise demonstrated in a number 
of parallel and more specific documents of various nature. 
The Strategy insisted that the exit from the situation should 
be searched for in the current crisis, and also included 
appropriate, credible and supportive policy instruments. The 
connundrums of current budgetary and monetary policy, as 
well as the direct support given by governments to the 
economic sectors, came under the scrutiny of the political, 
institutional and other participants involved. The new (’exit’) 
approach should rest on the coordination of economic 
policies (or coordinated market economies),to be comprised 
of the following segments: 1) Defining a credible exit 
strategy, instruments and measures, with restored state aid 
(based on a number of principles and instruments: 
withdrawal of a fiscal stimuli as soon as possible, and 
recovery of SMEs; short-term unemployment support; 
sectoral support schemes with possible distorting effects on 
the single market; access to financial support to SMEs; 
withdrawal of support to the financial sector, starting with 
government guarantee schemes); 2) The reform of the 
financial system (to comprise: implementing reforms of the 
supervision of the financial sector; filling the regulatory gaps, 
promoting transparency, stability and accountability, notably 
as regards derivatives and market infrastructure; completing 
the strengthening of accounting and consumer protection 
rules; strengthening the governance of financial institutions 
consistent weaknesses because of the financial crisis and risk 
identification and management; better prevention and 
management of possible financial crises); 3) Pursuing smart 
budgetary consolidation for long-term growth, because 
public finances are critical for restoring the conditions for 
sustainable growth and new jobs. Reduction of budget deficit 
below 3 % until the end of 2014 was introduced as the rule, 
and the consolidation of public finances would have to be 
supported by appropriate budgetary consolidation 
programmes. It happened that this course might well 
jeopardize some other goals of the Union, especially those 
pertaining to the so-called ’European social model’, for 
example, in the respective spheres of education, pensions, 
health cares, social protection; and 4) Coordination within 
the Economic and Monetary Union. The ultimate aim of 
modernization, initiated by the Strategy Europe 2020, was to 
establish a sustainable development based on the operative 
concepts of sustainability in the key sectors, both at the EU 
level and within the Member States. 
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5. Recommendations for the 
Industrial Development of 
the SEE 
The SEE 2020 Strategy, following the general guidance of 
the EU Strategy 2020, stipulated an export competitiveness 
of industrial products, with high added values. This task 
should be realized in three consecutive phases, viz.: 
revitalization and recovery; restructuring and reengineering; 
and renaissance of development and competitiveness. 
Industrial development should be based on investments into 
new technology, innovations, R&D and human capital. These 
are altogether expected to ensure the achievement of the key 
development aims, i.e., growth of employment, growth of 
competitiveness, increase in exports, attracting new 
investments, applying technical progress, and the creation of 
new SMEs. Particular measures will have to address a 
number of specific readjustments, including privatization of 
public companies, introducing more efficient environmental 
policies, and so forth. All the stipulated measures should be 
realized by pertinent improvements in the following thematic 
clusters: 1) Strengthening competition, productivity and 
export growth; 2) Industrial restructuring on the basis of 
implementing knowledge-based economy and sustainable 
development; 3) Improvement of institutional and legal 
framework and business climate; 4) Employment growth; 5) 
Harmonized territorial development; 6) Low carbon-dioxide 
activities, in line with climate change requirements; and 7) 
Development of business, innovation and industrial 
infrastructure (industrial zones, industrial parks, clusters, and 
others). In this respect, any further delay in defining a new 
industrial policy may be expected to only further deteriorate 
the SEE economies. Thereby, until 2020, the average level of 
GDP per capita in the SEE region should reach 44% of the 
EU average, from its share of 36% in 2010, also creating 1 
million of new jobs. An improved transparency of procedures 
and institutions in the public sector, through creating 
appropriate legal framework, has also been stipulated in the 
Strategy. According to the Strategy, the SEE economies are 
expected to grow faster than the planned average growth of 
the EU.
9
 This is, however, highly debatable, having in mind 
the current and predictable limitations these countries have 
been facing, viz.: a low share of industry in the GDP 
(18.43%), paralleled by its low share in total employment 
(17.75%), and low share in GVA (19.5%); a deep lag in terms 
of the attained level of  technological progress and equipment; 
insufficient investments in the R&D (in the SEE countries 
                                                             
9 At theoretical level, this approach has been corroborated by a metaphor of 
‘regional lions and gazelles’, approximating differences in the growth dynamics 
among various regions, otherwise popular as of recently (Nijkamp, Zwetsloot, and 
Van der Wal, 2007). Perhaps, this metaphor may also apply to the (predicted) 
differences of growth rate between the EU and the SEE. 
0.3-1% of GDP); poor application of innovations, transfer of 
know-how and technology; a lack of highly qualified 
personnel and skills; a lack of capital regional infrastructure; 
and so forth. Particularly, the poor state of capital  technical 
infrastructure in the TEN-T core network corridors plays an 
extremely negative role regarding the development of the 
exportable sectors and services, and even massive FDI are 
not expected to substantially remove this hindrance until 
2030.  
Another important issue is the fact that, in the SEE region, 
there has been no authority or coordinating body 
commissioned to implement a common industrial policy 
within a common general strategic development framework. 
Now, each country expects that the others buy its exportable 
products or services, following the SEE 2020 Strategy, which 
suggests that a new development model should be based on 
appropriate ‘free trade area’ arrangement. However, this 
approach is very debatable, primarily, due to poor internal 
demand and a low share of the SEE exportable goods and 
services in the highly competitive regional and global export 
markets. So, under the current and foreseeable circumstances, 
which activities would be veritably designated as ‘regional 
gazelles’? Or, to put it somewhat differently, where are the 
true niches of a new industrial policy for this region, which 
might be expected to feature as the main driver of future 
dynamic growth? Over a shorter period, this question should 
be put on another track: high unemployment being the most 
burning and pressing social, economic and political issue in 
the SEE region, which industrial activities within the new 
concept of reindustrialization and the new industrial policy 
may be expected to provide a sharp increase in new jobs? 
Our starting-point is that, contrary to the SEE 2020 Strategy, 
it may well be expected that reindustrialization may play the 
role of the key driver for overcoming the crisis, provided 
some obstacles are opportunely removed. We conclude this 
part by introducing the comments of a number of 
authoritative academics on the main theme, to reflect the still 
open issues.  
Firstly, it is not easy to expect that public revenues in the 
future could be materialized – as stipulated and expected – at 
lower income levels and by introducing more austerity 
measures and, parallel to these, improving competitiveness. 
Apart from that, divergence among the SEE countries is also 
likely to parallel the steady divergence of this group of 
countries vis-à-vis the entire EU average. These differences 
will manifest themselves both in terms of territorial 
inequalities and income inequalities, and they will 
predictably not be easy to remove under the circumstance of 
a prolonged crisis
.10 
Consequently, the key general challenge 
                                                             
10 We are predicting a period of a prolonged development crisis for this group of 
countries, keeping in mind the following characteristics of their economies, viz.: 1) 
 American Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Vol. 1, No. 5, 2015, pp. 445-459 455 
 
reads as follows: on the one hand, a new industrial policy 
coordination is needed at all levels of strategic planning, 
governance and control, aimed at territorial integration of the 
SEE region, removal of its spatial fragmentation, and 
improvement of common competitiveness of the region; on 
the other, individual participants (regions and countries of the 
SEE) would have to, out of necessity, base their specific 
policies on their own understanding of concrete problems, in 
accord with the place-based approach, and with a view to 
improving the comparative advantages and competitiveness, 
respectively. However, both strands of adjustments should 
rest on the departure from the current still dominant 
competition model, based on the low-cost approach, to that 
based on the innovation- approach (Twigge - Molecey, 2012). 
Now, we will give a brief account on some open issues 
pertaining to the new industrial development cycle in the 
SEE region, mostly starting from a few statements of the 
axiomatic nature. In the first place, as Hare (2008) 
emphasized, in the transition economies of the SEE countries, 
restructuring and diversification are more urgent to undertake 
– and at the same time more difficult to realize – than in the 
more developed economies. The state is rarely able to select 
good sectors for an economy to diversify into, either because 
of institutional failures, market imperfections, or their 
combined impact. In any case, the range of needed 
diversification of industry is almost always broader than that 
which could be reached by state interventions, which tend to 
produce rather narrow production patterns. Consequently, we 
are herein emphasizing that there might be a niche for a more 
productive approach in designating a new industrial policy 
for the entire SEE region, by resting on the recent experience 
of the so-called ‘coordinated market economies’. In a rather 
optimistic and ‘enthusiastic’ way, we may assume that, after a 
phase of regression and disintegration, the progressive stages 
of reintegration and recovery of the SEE region might follow. 
Should this prove sustainable, then there ought not to be 
room for further hesitation or delay in the implementation of 
new industrial policy solutions, as any hesitation or delay 
would render the current situation even worse in the mid-
term and long-term future (periculum in mora). The future 
prospects in the SEE region are, at least ‘nominally’, similar 
                                                                                                        
Erratic and unreliable patterns of investments, basically dependable of the impact 
of crisis dynamics; 2) Similarly, erratic pattern of market changes on domestic 
growth and market change; 3) Ever larger capital costs for companies, basically 
depending on the loans (disinvesting with regard to the non-core assets, rigorous 
cost cuts, extension of loan return period, reducing some segments of production); 
4) A lack of intellectual and human capital, skills, innovations, investments in the 
R&D, and similar; 5) Extremely negative  impacts of international credit rating 
agencies (decreasing value of shares on stock exchanges of the country, 
decreasing value of companies in the market, rising interest rates and 
discouraging potential investors); 6) Inclination of export credit agencies and 
development institutions financing development to cover ‘strong’ projects, and so 
on); 7) Inferior and substandard environmental regulations, especially with regard 
to the impact of climate change; 8) Infrastructural risks, water management and 
energy efficiency; 9) Poor economic regulation and institutional framework for 
growth. For more details on this issue, cf. Zekovic and Vujosevic, 2014). 
to the analogous dilemmas in the EU at large, especially with 
regard to improving its competitiveness in the international 
interest power game. 
In terms of institutional adjustments, and at least partially 
contrary to the provision formulated in the SEE 2020 
Strategy, more than a model based on free trade areas should 
be stipulated. In the case of the SEE countries, it is about 
small open economies that have tremendously suffered from 
negative influences and external shocks generated by the 
global crisis. There has been a plethora of evidence (Diao, et 
al. 1999a) suggesting that welfare gains from trade 
liberalization may significantly be negated by the 
liberalization itself, also implying that it should be balanced 
by supplementary and corrective approaches. These recent 
findings replicate and further corroborate earlier results of the 
same authors (Diao, et al. 1999b), who pointed to the fact 
that this kind of trade policy has had little effect on 
reallocating resources into domestic R&D activities, and that 
it could significantly affect the cross-border spillovers of 
technological knowledge that stimulates growth. In general, 
trade liberalization may cause a decrease in growth and a 
long-term loss of social welfare, although it raises revenue 
quickly. 
Similarly, Bartlett and Prica (2012) indicated that 
transmission mechanisms of the crisis to the SEE region have 
been identified, viz., contractions of credit, FDI, remittances, 
and exports, and their variable impact across countries. Their 
analysis shows that institutional progress (the EU integration, 
transition reforms, better governance, and so on) has also had 
a number of negative repercussions, regarding primarily the 
poor or negative economic growth in the SEE region during 
the crisis. They concluded that ‘...the variable impact of the 
global crisis on the countries of the region can be explained 
mainly by their different degrees of integration into the EU 
and global economy’, and that ‘...institutional reforms that 
were introduced during the boom period only made countries 
more internationally integrated and therefore more vulnerable 
to the impact of the global economic crisis’. This raises a 
question: could this and similar findings nourish further 
resentments towards the Union, and at the same time pave 
the road to a stronger inclination towards a ‘Europeanizing 
outside the EU’. This finding also corroborates the earlier 
findings of the kind, for example, those of Diao and Yeldan 
(2000), who used an inter-temporal general equilibrium 
model, in which commodity trade and capital flows link 
regions and propagate shocks, and they showed that the 
effects of the crisis were distributed unevenly across 
countries. They also stated that the industrial economies went 
largely unscathed, only few were hit in the crisis, and 
concluded that the concern about the negative effects on 
industrial economies was almost unjustified. 
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As for the specific instruments to be used in the appropriate 
institutional and other adjustments, some researchers 
(Dullien, 2013) argue in favour of a European 
Unemployment Insurance, which would offer an answer to 
asymmetric and symmetric business cycle shocks. Such 
proposals are of particular relevance – also in the case of the 
SEE region – in relation to the social implications of the 
current crisis. In that respect, Vandenbroucke, et al. 2013, 
appreciate that ’excessive social imbalances’ threaten the EU 
countries as much as ’excessive economic imbalances’. They 
have indicated that the minimum wage policy could be a tool 
for stopping deflation, reducing inequalities, limiting nominal 
competitiveness and current account imbalances. 
To conclude this brief list of various opinions on the theme, 
one should point to the fact that the SEE economies lack the 
institutional and regulatory structure and arrangements to 
cope with the increasingly integrated capital markets. The 
loss of confidence is reflected in poor investment and 
consumption in the region. This may coincide with a 
tendency, which had been noticed earlier (Alba, et al. 1998), 
that economic recession, financial and corporate troubles, 
liquidity crunch, and political challenges reinforced a 
propensity to adventurous behaviour, which, should it take 
place in the SEE region, would be ominous concerning its 
future development prospects. 
6. Conclusion 
With the exception of Croatia, the other six SEE countries 
that have been addressed in this contribution are facing 
‘Europeanization outside the EU, with its limited assistance 
and support, under the conditions of a prolonged crisis’. 
Their economies and public finances are on the verge of 
collapse, which has been narrowing the maneuvering space 
for public authorities to intervene in developmental and 
related matters. This, especially, refers to redistribution and 
innovation industrial policies and a general shortage of 
financial, human, institutional, organizational and other 
resources. 
The completion of post-socialist transition reforms, now 
more in accord with the EU Community acquis is 
undoubtedly important, also as a precondition for a 
subsequent inclusion into the Union. The reforms in question 
are even more important vis-à-vis future socioeconomic 
development of this region, its territorial cohesion, and with 
respect to improving its positioning and competitiveness in 
the international political, economic, cultural and other 
power game. 
Following a sharp decline in economic activities and a 
subsequent difficult and slow recuperation, still a high rate of 
deindustrialization and high unemployment feature as the key 
social, economic and political problems in this region, 
paralleled by balance of payments and related problems. 
Predictably, these problems will not be easy to overcome in a 
shorter time period. A new generation of development 
concepts is needed together with a new concept of 
reindustrialization. 
The forecast dynamic growth of the SEE, paralleled by 
creating 1 million new jobs, cannot be realized without a 
strong industrial revival. In this respect, the EU Strategy 
2020 may serve as a starting-point to this end, which will 
have to be emulated via an appropriate regional strategy of 
the kind. A reindustrialization should assume the role of the 
building block in the new strategy, and it will have to be 
developed urgently. It is not only about a new concept of 
industrial development. More probably, it is about a necessity 
of changing the current mode of planning culture, which is 
substandard and inferior compared with the future 
development prospects, toward a more strategic thinking, 
research and governance. More elaborate development 
policies are needed based on analytic concepts of general 
categories comprising the SEE 2020 Strategy . For example, 
a number of concrete arrangements are needed to better 
utilize remittances and domestic savings as the sources of 
future investment, with a view to grossly replacing the 
dependence on the FDI and international loans. 
An another set of arrangements will be necessary regarding 
university education in the SEE region, with a view to both 
serving a new development and preventing brain drain. More 
SEE region-centered thinking is also needed in order to 
establish a common strategic framework for the respective 
national industrial policies. This would also help achieve 
another goal; to diminish regional development disparities 
within the region and develop it, relative to the more 
developed European regions. 
The next step should perhaps be directed to the elaboration of 
an appropriate strategic framework for the Balkans, or even 
for the entire ‘European South’. So far, there have been few 
proposals of this kind, which indicates the existence of a 
number of obstacles (Monastiriotis and Petrakos 2009a). 
Key findings and recommendations are: 
All the SEE countries found themselves in a ‘developmental 
schizophrenia’ after the years in which the neoliberal political 
and economic agenda dominated the public scene, followed 
by a prevalent anti-planning and anti-development stance 
among the elites and in the legislative and economic practice. 
Namely, recently numerous development strategies and 
similar documents have been adopted, yet these countries 
have not produced effective and applicable ‘exit strategies’ to 
cope with the predictably prolonged crisis and bleak 
development prospects in the future. Partly, this reflects a 
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general collapse of STRG in these countries, lasting now for 
a few decades, which will not be easy to renew, keeping in 
mind the still dominant political ideology of neoliberalism. 
The public finances in the SEE countries are on the verge of 
collapse. This narrows the manoeuvring space for public 
authorities to intervene in developmental and related matters, 
especially regarding redistribution and innovation policies 
due to a general shortage of financial, human, institutional, 
organizational and other resources. 
The SEE countries have all experienced a crisis, almost a 
total collapse of strategic thinking, research and governance, 
mostly as a result of poor planning culture and poor will of 
political and economic elites to implement strategic decisions, 
this being the most important segment of the ‘soft territorial 
capital’. This is a key problem on the horizon for the future 
elites. At the same time, they will have to manage the 
division between the long-term imperative to renew the 
strategic thinking, research and governance, and the urge to 
resolve the burning key development problems. 
There have been a number of open issues regarding the 
utilization of the current still dominant neoliberal approach to 
resolving economic and social issues vs. developing 
alternatives. 
The effective status of the SEE countries in economic, 
financial, social, ecological, and almost every other sense – 
being, in geographical terms, a part of the ‘inner peripheries 
of Europe’ – will further make their position more vulnerable 
in this respect. 
The SEE elites proved selfish, often incompetent and not 
interested in the public causes and benefits. Their behaviour 
has mostly followed the Pro domo sua pattern.
11
 
Another threat to the development prospects of the SEE 
countries can be further fragmentation of political space in 
the Western Balkans. This would especially impede the 
construction of a common regional approach for improving 
development prospects, based on the initiatives of veritably 
sovereign national participants. Schadler (2011) indicates to 
possibilities of a post-crisis ‘super-integration’ in the SEE 
countries, as well as rethinking or revamping of the SEE 
convergence model. 
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